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Abstract
We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly
known money payoffs, the Attraction Effect and Compromise Effect (AE and CE) in bargaining,
namely a tendency for bargainers to agree to an intermediate option (CE), or to an option
that dominates another option (AE). We conjecture that the relevance of the AE and CE in
bargaining is constrained by how focal the feasible agreements’ payoffs are. We indeed observe
that there are significant AEs and CEs, but these effects are mediated by the efficiency and
equality properties of the feasible agreements. Due to the allure of equality, the effects are
harder to observe when an equal earnings contract is available. Decoys are more effective in
shifting agreements from a very unequal contract to a less unequal one rather than the reverse.
Keywords: bargaining; attraction effect; compromise effect; focality; equality; efficiency.
JEL Classification: C70; C72; C92.
1 Introduction
The motivation for this paper comes from two behavioral regularities, found in individual de-
cision making studies, namely the Attraction Effect (AE) and the Compromise Effect (CE) (see
Huber et al., 1982; Huber and Puto, 1983; Simonson, 1989). Suppose a person must choose be-
tween say two apartments, A and B, that differ in two salient attributes, such as size and location.
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Two such apartments are shown in Figure 1 (where higher values of both size and location are
assumed to be more desirable). The choice is non-trivial since A is smaller but better located than
B. Suppose a third apartment, C, which is dominated by say apartment B but not by A, is added
to the choice set (see Figure 1a).1 The Attraction Effect (AE) arises when the decision maker is
more likely to choose B when the set of alternatives is {A, B, C} than {A, B}. This violates the ax-
iom known as Regularity (see Luce, 1977), which states that the probability of choosing an option
cannot increase when the choice set is expanded.
(a) Attraction Effect. (b) Compromise Effect.
Figure 1: Attraction and Compromise Effects in individual choice.
Consider then the case where adding the third alternative C makes option B a compromise
(second best on each attribute dimension), as shown in Figure 1b. The Compromise Effect (CE)
occurs when the decision maker is more likely to choose B when the set of options is {A, B, C}
than when it is {A, B}, once more a violation of regularity.
The AE and CE have been found to significantly influence choice in a variety of situations,
such as product choice (Doyle et al., 1999; Munro and Popov, 2013; Milberg et al., 2014), contin-
gent valuation (Bateman et al., 2008), job candidate selection (Highhouse, 1996; Slaughter et al.,
2006; Kuncel and Dahlke, 2020), sampling decisions (Trueblood et al., 2013; Noguchi and Stew-
art, 2014), elections (Pan et al., 1995; Herne, 1997), choice among gambles (Wedell, 1991; Herne,
1999; Beauchamp et al., 2019; de Haan and van Veldhuizen, 2015), legal judgments (Kelman et al.,
1996), menu choices in a restaurant (Pinger et al., 2016), and partner choice (Sedikides et al., 1999).
Various explanations for these effects have been put forward (see Section 2 below).
As far as we are aware, all the existing empirical research on the AE and CE has (with only
very few exceptions, described in the next section) been concerned with individual choice situa-
tions. In this paper we ask if there are also AEs and CEs in interactive settings, namely bargaining
situations, where two players can collaborate in a number of mutually beneficial ways, but there is
a conflict about exactly what form the collaboration should take. Negotiation researchers as well
as practitioners should be interested in learning the conditions under which adding a dominated
1C is dominated by B in the sense that B is strictly better than C on both attribute dimensions.
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option to an existing menu of options is likely to affect the bargaining outcome, and when one can
increase the likelihood of an agreement on a certain ‘target’ option by manipulating the menu of
feasible agreements such that the target becomes a compromise.
To see the managerial relevance, consider a hiring committee whose members must agree on
what candidate to select from a small number of job applicants. There may be only a few (two
or three) applicants, or prior shortlisting has reduced the set to such a small number. Another
managerial example is intra-organizational negotiation, where a committee consisting of two de-
partment heads (of say production and advertising) must agree to a product design and adver-
tising policy. Due to various technological constraints, or to limits on how many options the
committee want or can consider, there is only a small number of feasible policies. A third example
is collective bargaining between employers and unions, where the negotiation focuses on which
wage-working conditions package to agree on. In these situations it is often the case that there are
few options, some of which may be compromises, others may be dominated, and so it becomes
natural to ask if there exist AEs and CEs.2
We study the AE and CE in bargaining by letting players negotiate over a set of options (re-
ferred to as “contracts”), where each contract has two attributes, namely how much money each
player gets if they agree to the contract in question.3 See Figure 2 below. The set of feasible con-
tracts (the contract set) either consists of two, S = {A, B}, or three contracts, T = {A, B, C}. An
agreement is an element from the contract set (the players cannot agree to more than one element,
or to a lottery over contracts). If they agree to say contract B, then Player 1 (2) gets a monetary
payoff, B1 (B2). If they fail to agree, each bargainer gets zero.
Each axis in Figure 2 measures each player’s subjective payoff. In our experiment we assume
that players are self-interested and risk neutral, such that the utility from a contract equals the
money it pays out. Of course, it is possible that players have social preferences (see, e.g., Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). In this case the ordinal
relationships between the contracts in money space could differ from the ones in utility space.
Nevertheless, we show, in the Online Appendix, that the money based rankings are robust to
(moderate) other-regarding preferences. More precisely, our findings for the AE and CE also hold
for inequity averse bargainers, as long as the concerns for disadvantageous and advantageous in-
equality (α and β) are not too large. Similarly, our results are robust to both maximin and efficiency
2Other, non-managerial, examples include a couple who are about to buy a new car, or parents deciding which
school to send their child to.
3The fact that the objects of choice specify a distribution of money across a group of people clearly distinguishes
bargaining from the existing individual choice research on AE and CE, where individuals choose between (hypothetical
descriptions of) real goods that differ in various physical attributes. Another difference, pointed out by a referee, is that
in individual multi-attribute choice the individual cares about each attribute, while in our bargaining set-up a purely
self-interested person cares only about one attribute, namely his own money payoff – but players can clearly not freely
choose their preferred contract since the other person can veto it. We believe that restricting attention to bargaining over
pairs of money payoffs is a reasonable simplification. It also provides a direct link to bargaining theory. We think that
the presence of exact monetary values placed by each player on the alternatives makes context effects harder to observe
because it introduces equality and total payoff considerations. In the absence of these considerations, we would expect
the effects to be even stronger. Future research can study more complex settings where players bargain over goods
described by multiple attributes.
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preferences as long as the concerns for these properties are not too strong.
(a) Attraction Effect. (b) Compromise Effect.
Figure 2: The Attraction and Compromise Effects in bargaining.
In Figure 2a the contract C is strictly dominated by B, but not by A. We define the AE in
bargaining as follows: the bargainers are more likely to agree on B when the contract set is T =
{A, B, C} than when it is S = {A, B}. In terms of the data, the AE means that the proportion
of agreements on B is higher in the first than the second case. In Figure 2b, adding contract C
makes B a compromise (i.e., each player’s second best contract in terms of money payouts). The
CE in bargaining arises when the bargainers are more likely to agree on B when the contract set
is {A, B, C} than when it is {A, B}. As we explain below, we regard both the AE and the CE
as a violation, at the level of the aggregate data, of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
condition, IIA (Nash, 1950), which states that if the bargainers agree to some option when there
is a large set of alternative options available, then the same option is agreed to when the set of
alternatives is reduced.4
Why might we expect there (not) to be an AE and CE in bargaining in the first place? Consider
first cooperative bargaining theory (see Thomson, 1994). As we show in Section 5 below, both
the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky,
1975) rule out the AE, and they yield different predictions regarding the CE.5 Among ordinal
bargaining solutions, the Fallback Solution (Brams and Kilgour 2001; see also de Clippel and Eliaz
2012) predicts both the AE and CE, while the Ordinal Egalitarian Solution (Conley and Wilkie,
2012), predicts the CE but rules out an AE.
A well-known hypothesis for coordination and bargaining situations (see Schelling, 1960; My-
erson, 1989) is that the bargainers can overcome the coordination problem by identifying a focal
4As already remarked earlier, it is possible that players have preferences such that the location of contracts in utility
space differ from the one in monetary reward space; what then appears to be an AE (CE) might be a different context
effect. However, regardless of whether it is actually an AE or CE, such an effect will always amount to a violation of
IIA.
5As we explain below, these models cannot be directly applied to our setup, since our set of feasible payoffs is not
convex. We instead apply the appropriate extensions of these solutions, from Mariotti (1998) and Nagahisa and Tanaka
(2002).
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contract. One source of focality can be desirable money payoffs (equal or total earnings maxi-
mizing, or some combination thereof). Based on existing research (see, e.g., Roth and Murnighan,
1982; Isoni et al., 2014; Luhan et al., 2017; Galeotti et al., 2019), we expect such payoff focality to
influence the agreement. Payoff based notions such as equality and total earnings are cardinal
properties. Our hypothesis is that what we call relational focality, namely salient properties of a
contract based on ordinal (rank-based) comparisons (such as a contract being a compromise be-
tween others, or dominating another contract) also serve to make a contract focal, and this gives
rise to the CE and AE.6 We expect that if a contract is both payoff and relationally focal, then it is
highly likely to be agreed on. It is perhaps more interesting to consider how payoff and relational
focality interact when they suggest different agreements, and the purpose of the paper is to shed
empirical light on this relationship.7
We conducted two within-subject experiments. In Experiment 1, we explore different games
where we vary the payoffs, and hence the payoff focality, of the base contracts A and B, and mea-
sure if, by adding the C contract, making one of the base contracts a compromise or dominant has
a significant effect on the observed distribution of agreements. The findings from the first exper-
iment led us to conduct a second experiment that employed the same design and procedures as
Experiment 1 but with a different list of games to test the robustness of the CE and AE. The list
includes both old (from Experiment 1) and new games. The main finding of these experiments is
that there are significant AEs and CEs in our bargaining environment, but only under certain con-
ditions on contracts A and B’s (and sometime C’s) payoffs. Relational focality is thus constrained
by payoff focality. Our interpretation is that it is only when payoff focality is relatively weak that
relational focality, and hence the CE and AE, significantly manifest themselves. We now provide
more detail on our findings.
Significant CE: We observe a significant CE when the two base contracts A and B are ‘equally
unequal’ (namely located symmetrically around the 45 degree line), and there is not too much
conflict among the players about which one to agree to.
Second, if neither A nor B offers equal payoffs (and they are not symmetric around the 45 de-
gree line), then a significant CE arises when the target contract (the one that is made a compromise
by adding C) is the least unequal of the contracts.
Third, there is a significant CE even when the target contract is Pareto efficient and offers
the players exactly the same payoffs, as long as the total earnings offered by the contract are
sufficiently small. Otherwise the contract is so payoff focal that there is little ‘room’ for raising
its popularity further by making it a compromise. In our opinion, this is a particularly important
finding: relational focality can matter for a contract even when that contract already possesses a
6There is also a literature on focality based on purely contextual properties (’labels’); see for example Schelling
(1960); Mehta et al. (1994); Crawford et al. (2008); Bardsley et al. (2010); Isoni et al. (2013, 2014); Faillo et al. (2017); Isoni
et al. (2020).
7These sources of focality can also be thought of as affecting the players’ relative bargaining power, in that they
influence what bargaining positions a player can credibly take up (see also Roth and Murnighan, 1982; Roth, 1985;
Bolton and Karagözoğlu, 2016). According to this view, the AE and CE play a role in bargaining because they affect a
player’s bargaining power. We thank a referee for drawing our attention to this relationship.
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very strong property of offering perfectly equal and efficient payoffs.
Significant AE: We observe a significant AE when the target contract is the less unequal base
contract, and neither the C contract nor the target are exactly equal. If the base contracts are
symmetric around the 45 degree line, and hence equally payoff focal, the AE is less strong than
the CE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the related literature.
We define the AE and CE in bargaining in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the experimental bar-
gaining games, the experimental design and logistics of the first experiment. Section 5 describes
our predictions and hypotheses. The experimental findings of the first experiment are reported in
Section 6. Section 7 contains the experimental games and design of the second experiment. Sec-
tion 8 presents the main results of this second study. Section 9 discusses the findings, and suggests
some future research. We conclude in Section 10. The Online Appendix contains the experimental
instructions, additional theory, and supplementary data analysis.
2 Related Literature
While there have been many studies of the AE and CE in individual choice settings (for an overview,
see Frederick et al., 2014; Lichters et al., 2015, 2016),8 we are aware of only few studies of these ef-
fects in interactive settings. Galeotti et al. (2019) considered the trade-off between equality and
efficiency in a bargaining setting. Their games vary the severity of the trade-off between equality
and total earnings maximization. Some of their games are two-sided, consisting of one equal con-
tract and two symmetrically unequal contracts, while others are one-sided, consisting of one equal
and one unequal contract. In comparing one-sided and two-sided games, they observed that the
equal contract is more likely to be agreed upon in two-sided games, a finding they interpret as a
CE. The AE was not investigated.9 The current paper launches a systematic investigation of the
CE and AE in bargaining.
We are aware of two other investigations of the AE (but not CE) in interactive situations. Col-
man et al. (2007) and Amaldoss et al. (2008) consider one-shot simultaneous-move games with
‘strategic asymmetric dominance’. This means that a player has a strategy x that is strictly or
weakly dominated by just one of the other strategies, y. There is a strategic asymmetric domi-
nance effect if the presence of x makes the player more likely to choose y. Since x is dominated by
y for an individual player, their AE is close to the one found in individual choice.
The main purpose of our experiment is to collect data rather than to develop and test a theory
of the AE and CE in bargaining. It may nonetheless be useful to note that some of the proposed
explanations for the AE and CE in individual choice settings10 can be relevant for bargaining.
8Most of the empirical studies use hypothetical choice methods. Some exceptions are Simonson and Tversky (1992),
Doyle et al. (1999), Herne (1999), Beauchamp et al. (2019), de Haan and van Veldhuizen (2015), and Lichters et al.
(2017). These studies find significant effects with incentivized choice. Some criticisms of the existing studies are raised
in Frederick et al. (2014), Yang and Lynn (2014), and Lichters et al. (2015).
9Some of the games we use are the same as in Galeotti et al. (2019), and we compare the findings in Section 6 and 8.
10These explanations include reason-based choice (see Simonson, 1989; Shafir et al., 1993), where the decision maker
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For example, in a multi-attribute choice set-up Poterack (2015) and Tserenjigmid (2019) let the
minimum value along each dimension serve as a reference point. In a bargaining context the
addition of a decoy changes the minimum payoff from an agreement for one but not the other
player (cf Figure 2). If players resist agreeing to their least favorable contract, this would create an
effect in the direction of the CE and AE.11 Future work can develop and experimentally test such
theories of the AE and CE in bargaining.
3 The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining
A contract specifies how much money Player 1 and 2 gets. Player 1 and 2 negotiate either over a
set of two contracts, denoted S = {A, B}, or over a set of three contracts, T = {A, B, C}. The only
difference is thus whether contract C is feasible or not. We refer to the contracts in S as the base
contracts. The bargaining game based on a given contract set is referred to simply as the game (G).
We refer to the game based on contract set S as the base game (BG). Contract C is referred to as the
decoy, and the base contract that the decoy is intended to make more focal is the target.
Denote by pSi the proportion of bargaining pairs who agree to contract i, where i = A, B, when
the contract set is S = {A, B}. Similarly, let pTj denote the proportion of bargaining pairs who
agree to contract j = A, B, C when the contract set is T = {A, B, C}. All these proportions are
calculated out of all interactions, including those that ended in disagreement. We define the AE
and CE in terms of these aggregate contract agreement proportions.
In what follows we assume that contract B is the target (as in Figure 2). We say that a contract
strictly dominates another if the former offers each player a strictly higher amount of money than
the latter, and that it is a compromise if for each player its money payouts are the second highest,
while each of the other contracts gives one player its highest payoff and the other its lowest.
Definition 1. (Attraction Effect, AE) Suppose the decoy C is strictly dominated by B, but not by A. The
AE arises when pTB > p
S
B.
Definition 2. (Compromise Effect, CE) Suppose the decoy C makes B a compromise. The Compromise
Effect arises when pTB > p
S
B.
We detect AE and CE in the data by comparing the proportions of agreements on the target con-
tract when the contract set is S and when it is T. If the latter proportion is significantly larger than
the former, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis, that there is an AE
or CE.
when faced with a difficult choice looks for reasons that allow him or her to make a decision; such reasons can be
based on dominance or compromise. Other explanations rely on reference-dependent individual choice, where the
attractiveness (utility) of a choice alternative is assumed to depend not only on its own absolute properties, but also
on how it is related to other alternatives (see for example Wedell, 1991; Simonson and Tversky, 1992; Tversky and
Simonson, 1993; Kivetz et al., 2004; Bordalo et al., 2013; Cunningham, 2013; Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013; Masatlioglu and
Uler, 2013; Ok et al., 2015; Poterack, 2015; Tserenjigmid, 2019; Bushong et al., 2020; Castillo, 2020).
11We thank a reviewer for drawing our attention to this possibility.
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4 Experiment 1
4.1 The Bargaining Games
We collected data from 22 games, shown in Table 1 and Figure 3. There are four Base Games (BG), 1,
4, 7, and 16 (marked in grey in the table), each with contract sets S = {A, B}. In Game 1 (BG1) the
two contracts are ‘symmetrically unequal’. In BG4 there is an equal and total earnings maximizing
contract (B). BG7 is similar to BG4, except that the equal contract is Pareto efficient but not total
earnings maximizing. Finally, BG16 has a contract that offers nearly equal payoffs. By adding
different C contracts to the base games, we can assess how the strength of the AE and CE depends
on the nature of the added contract C, and how these effects vary across different base games.
We also collected data for two games, G15 and G22, where the C contract was strictly dom-
inated by both base contracts. We thought it would be interesting to see if the presence of such





1 (40,60) (60,40) – –
2 (40,60) (60,40) (80,20) B Compromise
3 (40,60) (60,40) (50,30) B Attraction
4 (40,120) (80,80) – –
5 (40,120) (80,80) (20,140) A Compromise
6 (40,120) (80,80) (20,100) A Attraction
7 (40,120) (60,60) – –
8 (40,120) (60,60) (5,155) A Compromise
9 (40,120) (60,60) (30,130) A Compromise
10 (40,120) (60,60) (120,40) B Compromise
11 (40,120) (60,60) (155,5) B Compromise
12 (40,120) (60,60) (70,40) B Compromise
13 (40,120) (60,60) (30,110) A Attraction
14 (40,120) (60,60) (50,50) B Attraction
15 (40,120) (60,60) (30,30) B Decoy strictly dominated by A and B
16 (40,120) (65,55) – –
17 (40,120) (65,55) (30,130) A Compromise
18 (40,120) (65,55) (120,40) B Compromise
19 (40,120) (65,55) (50,50) B Attraction
20 (40,120) (65,55) (55,45) B Attraction
21 (40,120) (65,55) (30,110) A Attraction
22 (40,120) (65,55) (30,30) B Decoy strictly dominated by A and B
Note: Base games (1,4,7,16) are in grey.
Table 1: The bargaining games for Experiment 1.
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(a) Games 1-3. (b) Games 4-6.
(c) Games 7-15. (d) Games 16-22.
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of the bargaining games.
Note: The axes measure (in experimental points) how much each Person (1 and 2) gets for a given agreed contract. The
base contracts A and B are in black. The decoy contract C is in red (blue) when it is hypothesized to generate a CE (AE).
It is in grey when it is dominated by both A and B.
4.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment involved 17 sessions with 16 participants per session (272 participants in total).
We used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to program and conduct the experiment, and
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) to recruit the participants. Subjects earned on average £13 (including a
show-up fee of £4) and each session lasted just below an hour.
Upon arriving to the lab, subjects were allocated to different desks separated by partitions.
They received printed instructions (see Online Appendix) which were read aloud by the experi-
menter. Each subject encountered the 22 bargaining games in a different order. The design is thus
within-subject, providing a more powerful testbed for the hypothesized effects. Subjects did not
know the content of the 22 games in advance, and only knew that they would be re-matched after
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each game.12 Since different subjects encounter the games in a different order and are re-matched
in every round, we do not expect strong learning or order effects in the data that would bias
our comparisons across games, given similar experimental setups (see e.g. Andreoni and Miller,
2002; Isoni et al., 2014). Additional data analysis reported in the Online Appendix supports this
conclusion.
In each game that a subject encountered, one randomly selected subject was referred to as
Person 1 and the other as Person 2. Hence, a subject could be Person 1 in some games, and Person
2 in others. We used these player labels to simplify the description of and reference to the contracts.
When two subjects were matched, it was randomly decided which feasible payoffs were assigned
to Person 1 or 2. As an example, G4 came in two versions: Person 1 has feasible payoffs 40 and 80
(so 2 has 80 and 120), and Person 1 has payoffs 80 and 120 (2 has 40 and 80). We analysed the data
and found no significant effect of the labels on behavior. In particular, the earnings of subjects
labeled Person 1 and 2 are not significantly different (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.687).13
Each pair of subjects were presented with a set of either two or three contracts. The contracts
were displayed, in the same random order, on the matched subjects’ computer screens. In each
game subjects were given 120 seconds to negotiate. They made contract proposals by clicking with
their mouse on a contract, and could write free-form chat messages to each other. Subjects could
write as many or as few messages as they wanted. They were asked not to reveal their identity,
physically threaten the other subject, or discuss what might happen outside the lab. Subjects were
informed that failure to comply would result in exclusion.
Figure 4 shows the computer screen the subjects saw. Note that the contracts were not given
any particular labels. In order to reach an agreement, subjects had to click on the same contract.
An agreement was binding and could not be changed. As long as subjects had not clicked on the
same contract, they could withdraw their contract proposal or replace it with a new one, in real
time and as many times as they wanted. Subjects were also free to make no proposals at all. If
no agreement was reached before the end of the 120 seconds, the two paired subjects earned no
points from that game.
12We designed the matching protocol algorithm in order to minimize the re-matching between the same participants
in order to curtail repeated-game effects.
13Similarly, we find no labeling effect on who first starts the chat (p = 0.421) or sends a proposal (p = 0.461). When
we analyze the data, we thus pool the data across player labels.
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Figure 4: Decision screen.
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selected three of the twenty-two rounds
(the same for all subjects in a given session) for payment. Points were converted to pounds at
the exchange rate of 20 points = £1. Paying for the outcome of a selected number of periods
rather than just one is an alternative method to the “pay-one” approach but with the advantage
of equilibrating more the payment across participants and limiting the impact of very unlucky
draws in the final earnings (see Charness et al., 2016).
5 Theory and Hypotheses
Our unstructured bargaining protocol gives the subjects complete freedom to make offers when-
ever they wish. This, with the fact that communication via chat messages is allowed, and that
an agreement can be made binding, makes predictions from cooperative bargaining theory (see
Thomson, 1994) relevant.
5.1 The IIA Axiom
We start by considering what the well-known axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)—
interpreted as a positive statement about what will (not) happen in an actual bargaining situation—
implies for the AE and CE. Nash (1950) defined IIA for single-valued solution concepts; we use
the analogous definition for set-valued solution concepts14 which can be found in Mariotti (1998).
Let ϕ(T) be the set of contracts predicted by a solution when the set of contracts is T.
Definition 3. (IIA) If S ⊂ T and ϕ(T) ∩ S 6= ∅, then ϕ(S) = ϕ(T) ∩ S.
14In a bargaining situation with a finite set of contracts, theoretical predictions are potentially set valued. For example
in a situation like BG1, where the set of contracts is {(40, 60), (60, 40)}, it is not possible for a solution to be symmetric,
Pareto efficient (which rules out the disagreement point (0, 0)) and single valued. Any symmetric and Pareto efficient
solution consists of {(40, 60), (60, 40)}.
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There is a quite simple intuition behind IIA. If the bargainers find a contract, say B, attractive
enough to possibly agree on it when there is a large set of alternative contracts (contract set T),
then the bargainers should still find B sufficiently attractive when some of the ‘rival’ contracts are
not available (contract set S). Furthermore, contracts that were ruled out in T should still be ruled
out in S, since (some of the) contracts that were considered more attractive are still available.
We interpret set-valued predictions as a prediction that the final agreement will lie in the set.
Without adding further restrictions on the probability of agreements on different contracts, an
observation that there are significantly more agreements on B in G2 and G3 than in BG1 is not
inconsistent with IIA. In order to deal with this indeterminacy, we appeal to the principle of in-
sufficient reason and introduce the following auxiliary assumption.
Assumption 1. If the solution contains two or more contracts, then each of them is equally likely to be
agreed upon.
In terms of our data, IIA together with assumption 1 predicts that
pSA ≥ pTA and pSB ≥ pTB,
which clearly rules out both the AE and CE.15
Hypothesis 1. (IIA) There are neither AE nor CE in any of the bargaining games.
Note that the IIA axiom is silent on what contracts will actually be agreed upon: all it predicts
is that the frequency of agreements on any given contract cannot decrease as the set of available
contracts shrinks. We also discuss the predictions of the leading solution concept in cooperative
bargaining theory, namely the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950, in what follows referred to
as NBS), which satisfies the IIA axiom. The original NBS assumed that the set of feasible payoffs
is convex, which does not hold in our finite set-up (recall that players cannot make a binding
agreement to a lottery between contracts). We therefore consider the extension of the original
solution to a finite set of feasible payoffs by Mariotti (1998).16 His solution selects the contract(s)
with the highest Nash product. Suppose bargainers are rational, self-regarding, and risk neutral,
and that this is common knowledge.17 Then some straightforward calculations reveal that the NBS
predicts contracts {A, B} in BG1–G3, contract B in BG4–G6, and contract A in BG7–G22, except
G10 and G18, where the prediction is {A, C}.
15Since in our experiment subjects are rematched from round to round, we do not observe the same pairs bargaining
over S = {A, B} and T = {A, B, C}, so we expect IIA to hold only in a probabilistic sense. Suppose IIA holds for each
possible pair in the population; then any pair that agrees on a base contract in contract set T agrees on the same contract
in set S (and any pair that is equally likely to agree to two or more contracts in contract set T does the same in S). The
actual frequency of agreements on the base contract can occasionally be lower in S than in T because we are looking
at a sample rather than at all possible pairs in the population, but it should not be systematically lower. If it is, IIA is
violated.
16Another extension of the NBS to a non-convex domain is Conley and Wilkie (1996), but they assume that the set is
comprehensive, which means that the players can dispose of utilities (see Thomson, 1994). This is not possible in our
experiment.
17The restrictiveness of these assumptions is discussed below.
12
Mariotti’s solution never generates an AE, since a dominated contract always has a smaller
Nash product than the contract that dominates it. The same is true for the CE if there is only one
contract that maximizes the Nash product. With the addition of Assumption 1, Mariotti’s model
predicts that there will never be a CE.18
While contracts predicted by the NBS clearly depend on our assumption that agents are self-
interested and risk neutral, the prediction that there is no AE and no CE holds for other prefer-
ences, e.g. inequity averse or social welfare preferences (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and
Rabin, 2002), provided that the utility a player gets from a contract depends only on that contract
and not on what other contracts are available.
5.2 Bargaining Solutions that Predict a Compromise and/or Attraction Effect
According to the Fallback Bargaining Solution (see Brams and Kilgour 2001; Kıbrıs and Sertel 2007;
de Clippel and Eliaz 2012; in what follows referred to as FBS) each player has a strict ranking of
the contracts. The players first consider if a contract is ranked first by both players; if so, they
agree to it. Otherwise, they look for a contract that is ranked either first or second by both players.
If such a contract exists, it becomes the agreement. If not, they consider if there are contracts that
are ranked first, second, or third, by each player, and so on.
As de Clippel and Eliaz (2012) point out, the FBS generates an AE and CE. Suppose Player 1’s
ranking is A  B, and 2 has the opposite ranking. If they bargain over S, the fallback solution is
{A, B}, and by Assumption 1 each alternative is equally likely to be agreed upon. Suppose then
the set of contracts is T and that contract C is dominated by B (but not by A). Player 1’s ranking
is B  C  A, while 2’s is A  B  C. The decoy drives a wedge between Player 1’s ranking of
A and B, and A is now relatively worse for Player 1 than before. The FBS is B. Similarly, there can
be a CE. If a contract C is added such that Player 1’s ranking is C  B  A, and 2’s is A  B  C,
the solution is again B. For Player 1 the decoy pushes A to the bottom.
Hypothesis 2. (Fallback Bargaining Solution): There is an AE and a CE in all games.
An alternative to the NBS is the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution (henceforth
KSBS), extended to a finite set of feasible payoffs by Nagahisa and Tanaka (2002). Their solution
selects the contract(s) that maximize the payoff of the player getting the lower proportion of his
or her maximal possible (‘ideal’) payoff. Since adding a strictly dominated decoy does not affect
the ideal point, this solution never predicts an AE, but would predict a CE in some of our games
(see Online Appendix for more details). The Ordinal Egalitarian Solution (OES), due to Conley
and Wilkie (2012), generates a CE in all possible cases. It never predicts an AE.
18The Nash product of a contract does not depend on what other contracts are available. Thus, either i) C does not
maximize the Nash product in T, in which case the solutions for S and T must be identical (and, if the solution is
set-valued, frequencies of individual contracts are unchanged because of assumption 1), ii) C is the only contract that
maximizes the Nash product in T, or iii) C and one or more other contracts maximize the Nash product in T, in which
case any contract in the solution for S must still be part of the solution for T, and its predicted frequency must decline
by Assumption 1.
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5.3 Relational Versus Payoff Focality
The FBS (and indeed the CE and AE themselves) are defined on the basis of purely ordinal in-
formation, i.e., only the players’ ranking of the contracts matters. This is what we above refer to
as relational focality. However, cardinal properties, such as equality of payoffs and total earning
maximization, are also important sources of focality (payoff focality).
Consider first the case where there is a base contract, say B, with equal and total-earnings
maximizing payoffs (BG4–G6). This is the most challenging environment for the CE or AE to occur,
since B is likely to be strongly payoff focal. A more favorable environment is BG7-G15, where
there is an equal contract competing with an unequal but total-earnings maximizing contract, and
targeting one of the two contracts with a decoy may tilt the balance in its favor.
In games BG16–G21, the equal payoff base contract is replaced with one offering nearly equal
payoffs; this weakens its payoff focality and hence leaves more room for relational focality and
the CE or AE. Finally, in BG1-G3 the two base contracts are symmetrically unequal, and since the
contracts are therefore equally payoff focal we expect this environment to be the most favorable
to the CE and AE.
We also wished to investigate if the strength of the CE depends on how attractive the decoy
itself is. We conjectured that an equal payoff decoy may be more effective than an unequal decoy,
since bargainers may notice an equal contract first and then look for Pareto improvements on
the decoy. This question is addressed by comparing BG16–G19 and BG16–G20. The target is the
same and offers unequal payoffs, while the decoy is either equal or nearly equal. Similarly, we
conjectured that a very extreme decoy—where, by extreme, we mean how unequal the decoy is—
would be more likely to be ignored (because of its implausibility as an agreement). We examine
this by comparing G8 and G9 (where the compromise is contract A), and G10, G11, and G12 (the
compromise is B).
Finally, we wished to consider games with decoys C that were dominated not just by a single
but both base contracts. The conditions for the AE are not satisfied in this case (the AE requires C
to be dominated by only one base contract). A natural null hypothesis is that there is no effect of
adding these contracts. An alternative hypothesis is that such C contracts can still affect behavior
by being closer to one of the base contracts, and in this sense still act as a ‘decoy’ for that base
contract. We test this by comparing BG7 with G15, and BG16 with G22.
6 Findings of Experiment 1
6.1 Overview
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the 22 games. The feasible contracts for each game are
shown in the ‘Contracts’ column, followed by the percentage of bargaining pairs who did not
reach an agreement, and who agreed on the contract A, B, and C, respectively (columns ‘Disagree’,
‘Agree on A’, ‘Agree on B’, and ‘Agree on C’). Recall that since we found no effects of labels (Person
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1 vs 2) on behavior, we pool the data across player labels 1 and 2.19
Table 2 also shows how long it on average took for people to reach an agreement (‘Time to
agree’ column). Note that pairs who disagreed are excluded from this average.
Game Contracts Disagree Agree Agree Agree Time toA B C on A on B on C agree (in sec.)
1 (40,60) (60,40) 8.08% 45.96% 45.96% 0% 89.93
2 (40,60) (60,40) (80,20) 6.62% 35.29% 55.15% 2.94% 90.21
3 (40,60) (60,40) (50,30) 7.35% 38.23% 52.21% 2.21% 88.38
4 (40,120) (80,80) 0% 2.21% 97.79% 0% 34.71
5 (40,120) (80,80) (20,140) 0.74% 1.47% 97.05% 0.74% 35.63
6 (40,120) (80,80) (20,100) 0% 1.47% 98.53% 0% 37.09
7 (40,120) (60,60) 0.74% 7.35% 91.91% 0% 63.67
8 (40,120) (60,60) (5,155) 5.15% 8.09% 86.76% 0% 63.28
9 (40,120) (60,60) (30,130) 1.47% 11.03% 87.5% 0% 53.38
10 (40,120) (60,60) (120,40) 1.47% 3.68% 91.17% 3.68% 49.04
11 (40,120) (60,60) (155,5) 0.74% 7.35% 91.17% 0.74% 52.86
12 (40,120) (60,60) (70,40) 2.21% 4.41% 91.17% 2.21% 51.23
13 (40,120) (60,60) (30,110) 3.68% 9.56% 86.76% 0% 54.19
14 (40,120) (60,60) (50,50) 3.68% 5.88% 90.44% 0% 44.34
15 (40,120) (60,60) (30,30) 2.94% 7.35% 89.71% 0% 52.19
16 (40,120) (65,55) 7.35% 17.65% 75% 0% 73.51
17 (40,120) (65,55) (30,130) 6.62% 17.65% 75% 0.73% 65.04
18 (40,120) (65,55) (120,40) 5.88% 5.15% 87.5% 1.47% 50.35
19 (40,120) (65,55) (50,50) 4.41% 8.82% 72.80% 13.97% 57.58
20 (40,120) (65,55) (55,45) 0.74% 11.03% 88.23% 0% 55.92
21 (40,120) (65,55) (30,110) 2.21% 17.65% 79.41% 0.73% 74.83
22 (40,120) (65,55) (30,30) 2.21% 12.5% 84.56% 0.73% 61.35
Notes: For each game there are 136 observations (number of pairs). Base games are shaded in grey. The contract labels A, B, and C
were not used in the experiment.
Table 2: Aggregate bargaining outcomes (Experiment 1).
A visual representation of how agreements (and disagreements) vary between each BG1, BG4,
BG7, and BG16 and the other games is given in Figure 5.
To test our hypotheses, we conduct Wilcoxon signed-rank tests using session averages as the
units of observation.20 Our hypotheses predict an effect in a particular direction (the AE and CE
are directional effects), except in cases where C is dominated by both A and B. Hence, all statistical
tests regarding AEs and CEs are one-tailed (this is specified when we report the results). In all
the other cases where we do not have a-priori or directional hypotheses, the tests are two-tailed.
Significance is evaluated at the 5% level, unless otherwise specified.
We think of the AE and CE as effects that benefit the target, so in order to claim that an AE
or CE has occurred, we require that the relative frequency of agreements on the target increases,
computed as a fraction of all interactions, not just those interactions that end in an agreement.
19Note that G1 and G10 are symmetric, so as a result of the pooling the agreement proportions on the unequal payoff
contracts are identical.
20In each session, subjects are exposed to the same 22 games. Hence, we have 22 multiple related observations for
each session. This is why we use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. As a robustness check, we also conducted parametric
tests. In particular, we checked the statistical significance of marginal effects computed from logit regressions on the
pair-level data. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the pair agrees on the targeted
contract, while the independent variables are dummies for the different games. Standard errors are clustered at the
session level. The results of parametric and non-parametric tests are qualitatively similar. Full details are available
from the authors upon request.
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Note: the difference in the agreement rate on C between a game and its corresponding base game is
obtained by setting the agreement rate on C equal to zero in the base game.
Figure 5: Changes in agreements on A, B, C and disagreements for each game, compared to the
base game
Intuitively, in order for B to be favored by the addition of C, B should become more popular
overall, not just as a fraction of the interactions that ended in an agreement. For example, if B is a
job applicant we think of the introduction of C as favouring B only if B becomes more likely to be
hired overall (not just conditional on the vacancy being filled) as a result of C being added to the
shortlist.21
To test whether there are CE and AE in all our games pooled together (excluding those where
contract C is dominated by both base contracts), we calculate, for each session, the average differ-
ence in agreement on the target contract between each game and the corresponding base game.
This difference is significantly greater than zero when we pool together all games where we hy-
pothesize a CE (one-tailed test, p = 0.014), and weakly significantly larger than zero when we
pool together all games where we hypothesize an AE (one-tailed test, p = 0.067). This suggests
that both CE and AE are statistically relevant in our setting.
21We also analyzed the data including only the interactions that led to an agreement. The results are qualitatively
similar. Full details are available from the authors upon request.
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These effects are however mainly driven by specific games (20 vs. 16 for the AE; 2 vs. 1 and
18 vs. 16 for the CE). In particular, regarding the CE we find that contract B is agreed on more
frequently in G2 compared to BG1 (one-tailed test, p = 0.050). A similar pattern is observed
when we compare G18 and BG16 (one-tailed test, p = 0.007). The AE in G20 is also significant
(one-tailed test, p = 0.009).
Finding 1. We find significant AE and CE in specific games, and these effects survive when we pool the
data from all games together.
These findings reject IIA (Hypothesis 1), the NBS predictions, and the KSBS predictions regarding
the AE. If we consider the ordinal bargaining models, the FBS and OES predictions of a CE in all
games (Hypothesis 2) are clearly rejected. Moreover, neither manages to capture the observed AE
pattern well (recall that the FBS predicts there should be an AE in all games, and the OES predicts
the exact opposite).
6.2 Games with an Equal Payoff Contract
The following is immediate from Table 2.
Finding 2. There are no significant AE or CE in any games with an equal and total payoff maximizing
contract (Games 4–6). If the equal payoff contract is not total payoff maximizing (Games 7–15), a decoy tar-
geting the other contract has some ability to reduce agreements on the equal contract, but not to significantly
increase the frequency of agreements on the target.
If we consider jointly all games with an equal contract (Games 4–6 and Games 7–15), we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the average difference in agreement on the target contract between
each game and the base game is zero (one-tailed tests, p = 0.265 for CE and 0.480 for AE). The
same applies if we look at the games separately.
An equal and total-earnings maximizing contract is strongly payoff focal, and introducing a
decoy that targets the unequal contract has no effect. The agreement rates on A and B are not
statistically different between BG4, G5 and G6 (one-tailed tests, p > 0.1 for all comparisons).
In BG7, subjects still agree mostly on the equal contract B, but less often than in BG4 (p =
0.033). This confirms the earlier finding that the payoff focality of an equal and Pareto efficient
payoff contract depends on whether the contract possesses the additional property of maximizing
total earnings (see Galeotti et al., 2019).
A decoy targeting the unequal contract A has no effect on the target (and thus there is no CE
or AE according to our definition), but may decrease the frequency of the equal contract. The
decrease in the frequency of the equal contract is (weakly) significant in G8 and G13 but not in G9
(one-tailed tests, p = 0.051, 0.079 and 0.140 respectively). Note that the decoy itself is never chosen
in these three games, and thus the decrease in the agreements on the equal contract translates into
an increase in the frequency of disagreement. Finally, a decoy targeting the equal contract B has
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no significant effect on either the target or the alternative contract.22
Given that the equal contract was so popular, it is not surprising that the decoys were unable
to increase its frequency further.23 What may be less obvious is that the decoys did not manage to
significantly increase the frequency of agreements on the other contract (A) even though there is
plenty of room for that to occur.
We also observe that both the NBS and KSBS systematically fail to capture the focality of the
equal payoff contracts; recall that in BG7–G15 both solutions almost always predict the unequal
contract A, while a vast majority of bargainers agree to the equal contract B.24
6.3 Games without an Equal Payoff Contract
6.3.1 Two Symmetrically Unequal Payoff Contracts
Consider first BG1, with two unequal base contracts, (40,60) and (60,40). The CE is significant (cf.
G2): subjects agree more on B than in BG1 (one-tailed test, p = 0.050 for B). In G3 the decoy
slightly increases agreements on the target, although not significantly so at conventional levels
(one-tailed test, p = 0.112). The decoy also reduces the frequency of agreements on A (p = 0.070).
Hence, there is some suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence of an AE.
Finding 3. In BG1, with two symmetrically unequal contracts, there is a significant CE (G2), and some
weaker evidence of an AE (G3).
6.3.2 The Case of a Nearly Equal Payoff Contract
Let us now consider if it matters whether a contract offers exactly, or only nearly equal payoffs.
We compare BG7 and BG16.
Finding 4. Observed agreements in BG16, which has a nearly equal payoff contract, are significantly
different from those in BG7, which has an equal payoff contract.
In BG7 more than 90% of bargaining pairs agree to the equal contract, while only 75% do so in
BG16. The agreement rate on B drops by about 17% in BG16 compared to BG7 (p = 0.001), while
the agreement rate on A increases by about 10% (p = 0.009). A similar finding for an experimental
mini-Ultimatum game is reported in Güth et al. (2001). One interpretation is that the property of
22The only exception is G10, where we observe a significant drop in agreements on A (one-tailed test, p = 0.020).
This is due to the fact that, in comparison to BG7, some agreements on A are replaced by agreements on C.
23 The data in Galeotti et al. (2019) showed a significant CE in some (but not all) games with an equal but not total-
earnings maximizing contract. Such contracts were less focal than in the current paper, and this leaves more room for
their frequency to increase via a CE. This lower focality could be due to game differences (that paper included games
where the equal contract offers much lower total earnings than the unequal one) or to different subject pools being
used. We explore games where the equal contract offers lower payoffs in Experiment 2 (see Finding 8).
24An obvious way to improve the prediction of the models is to replace self-interested preferences with inequity-
averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) preferences, or allow for a mix of these different preference
types. Note however that allowing for inequity aversion cannot explain any observed CE or AE according to the NBS
(or any observed AE according to the KSBS).
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offering equal payoffs to the players confers focality over and beyond what it gets from being
inequality minimizing.
Not only are agreements in BG7 and BG16 different, but the corresponding AEs and CEs are
also different in magnitude. If we pool together all games with a nearly equal contract where we
expect a CE, we find that the average difference in agreement on the target contract between each
game and the base game is positive and significant (one-tailed test, p = 0.001). For the games
where we expect an AE, the difference is also positive but not significant (p = 0.146).
If we look at the games separately, the nearly equal payoffs contract (65,55) can be made sig-
nificantly more agreed on by making it a compromise (G18 vs. BG16; one-tailed test, p = 0.007).
Similarly, the same contract can be made more popular by introducing a decoy that is strictly
dominated (G20 vs. BG16; one-tailed test, p = 0.009). We summarize this in the following finding:
Finding 5. Unlike BG7, BG16 has significant AE and CE (G18 and G20), but only for the nearly equal
base contract, not for the more unequal base contract.
One interpretation of this finding is that there is more ‘room’ for the AE and CE to work in BG16
than in BG7. In BG16 it is therefore possible to raise agreements on the equal contract significantly
via the AE and CE. Note that, while there are significant AEs and CEs for the nearly equal base
contract, it is still not possible to make the other, more unequal, base contract more attractive to
the bargainers (cf games BG17 and G21).
6.4 Decoy Properties
In G19 the decoy offers equal payoffs, 14% agree on it, and fewer (although not significantly, p =
0.509) people agree on the target contract B than in the absence of the decoy (BG16). The decoy is
thus, if anything, ‘counter–productive’. In G20, the base contracts are the same as in G19, but the
decoy is now only nearly equal. When we compare G20 to BG16, we observe a significant increase
in agreements on B (one-sided test, p = 0.009) and a decrease in agreements on A (one-sided test,
p = 0.051).
Finding 6. The AE for BG16 with a nearly equal payoff contract is significant only when the decoy offers
nearly equal payoffs (cf G20), while it is insignificant when the payoffs of the decoy are perfectly equal (cf
G19).
We think it is striking how such a little difference in the payoffs offered by the decoy makes a
significant difference for the sign and magnitude of the AE. This suggest there is a significant
behavioral difference between exactly and nearly equal payoffs not only for base contracts, but
also for the decoy.25
We next consider if the strength of the CE depends on how extreme the decoy is. G8 and
G9, and G10, G11 and G12, all based on BG7 with base contracts (40,120),(60,60), differ in this
25We cannot with the current set of games say whether the significant AE in G20 is due to the target offering each
player the same gain relative to the decoy, or whether it is because the decoy offers unequal earnings and hence does
not compete in focality with the target. We investigate this in Experiment 2.
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respect. In none of the cases is there any CE, due to the overwhelming focality of contract (60,60).
We unfortunately do not in Experiment 1 have games that allow us to examine the effect of the
extremeness of the decoy for other base games, but Experiment 2 explores this further.
We finally consider the role played by contracts that are strictly dominated by both base con-
tracts. In G15 and G22 the contract (30,30) is strictly dominated by both base contracts. In G22
this makes contract (65,55) more frequently agreed on (p = 0.049), and (40,120) less, although not
significantly so (p = 0.120). Since (30,30) is dominated by both base contracts, this is not a ‘stan-
dard’ AE. One conjecture for why adding (30,30) makes agreements on (65,55) more attractive is
that (30,30) is closer to (65,55) than to (40,120). In this sense (30,30) serves as reference point for the
bargainers.26 G15 is similar to G22, but in the former game there is no significant effect of adding
a dominated contract, since the focality of the equal payoff contract (60,60) in BG7 is already so
high.
Finding 7. Adding a contract C that is dominated by both base contracts can raise agreement on one of
them, even though C is the only equal earnings contract.
6.5 Agreement Times
Although we are primarily interested in final bargaining outcomes, it is interesting to look also
at the agreement times (cf Table 2).27 Note that there is no time pressure in our experiment other
than the deadline. Provided that subjects agree on a contract before the deadline, they receive the
points specified in the agreed contract (without any discounting); furthermore, even if they agree
on a contract, they need to wait until the 120 seconds run out before starting the next round. In
spite of this, there are clear differences in agreement times between the games. We present and
discuss these differences in the online Appendix. Here, we only consider whether the addition of
a third contract affects agreement times when we pool all games together.
Overall, we find that agreement times decrease by 12.76% (9.47%) in the games where we ex-
pect a CE (AE) compared to the base games. The drop is statistically significant (p = 0.004 for CE
and p = 0.010 for AE), and it holds even if we include the situations that ended in disagreement
(by assigning them the maximum time of 120 seconds). In this latter case, agreement times de-
crease by 12.42% and 9.60%, respectively (p = 0.002 and 0.007). Thus, the evidence suggests that
adding a decoy speeds up the process of reaching an agreement, possibly by providing reasons to
choose one base contract over the other (cf. Shafir et al., 1993).
7 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 identified significant AEs and CEs, but only under certain conditions. We con-
ducted a second experiment to test whether the results from Experiment 1 can be replicated. We
26It is also the case that agreeing on (65,55) gives players more similar gains than (40,120), relative to (30,30). Our
data do not allow us to distinguish between the relative roles of closeness and equality of gains.
27There is a large experimental literature on bargaining with a ‘deadline’, see Karagözoğlu and Kocher (2019).
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also included new games to assess the robustness of the findings. The experimental design and
procedures of Experiments 1 and 2 are exactly the same except for the list of the 22 games.
To determine the sample size for Experiment 2, we conducted an a priori power analysis. As-
suming similar effect sizes to those observed in Experiment 1 (pooling all games re-included in
Experiment 2), a type-I error rate of 0.05 for one-sided tests, and a power of 0.80, we computed a
sample size of 9 independent observations. In Experiment 2 we ran a total of 16 sessions (inde-
pendent observations). So the sample size is comfortably above the required level.
7.1 The Bargaining Games
Table 3 and Figure 6 show the 22 games for which we collected data in Experiment 2. For ease of





1 (40,60) (60,40) – –
2 (40,60) (60,40) (80,20) B Compromise
3 (40,60) (60,40) (50,30) B Attraction
4 (80,120) (120,80) – –
5 (80,120) (120,80) (160,40) B Compromise
6 (80,120) (120,80) (90,50) B Attraction
7 (50,150) (150,50) – –
8 (50,150) (150,50) (170,30) B Compromise
9 (50,150) (150,50) (130,30) B Attraction
10 (40,120) (65,55) – –
11 (40,120) (65,55) (120,40) B Compromise
12 (40,120) (65,55) (55,45) B Attraction
13 (60,140) (95,65) – –
14 (60,140) (95,65) (140,60) B Compromise
15 (60,140) (95,65) (85,55) B Attraction
16 (60,140) (95,65) (80,40) B Attraction
17 (40,120) (60,60) – –
18 (40,120) (60,60) (120,40) B Compromise
19 (40,120) (50,50) – –
20 (40,120) (50,50) (120,40) B Compromise
21 (40,60) (60,40) (95,5) B Compromise
22 (40,120) (65,55) (155,5) B Compromise
Note: Base games (1,4,7,10,13,17,19) are in gray.
Table 3: The bargaining games for Experiment 2.
Games 1-9: The first group consists of games with two symmetrically unequal base contracts.
Games 1 (BG1), G2 and G3 are the same as the first three games of Experiment 1. By comparing
behavior in these three games, we can verify whether previous results are reproducible with new
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(a) Games 1-9. (b) Games 10-16.
(c) Games 17-20. (d) Games 21-22.
Figure 6: Graphical illustration of the bargaining games in Experiment 2.
Note: The axes measure (in experimental points) how much each Person (1 and 2) gets for a given agreed contract. The
base contracts A and B are in black. The decoy contract C is in red (blue) when it is hypothesized to generate a CE (AE).
participants. We also introduce additional games in order to test the robustness of our results.
With respect to BG1, BG4 and BG7 vary the degree of inequality of the payoffs in the two base
contracts. There is also some variation in the total payoffs at stake (BG4 and BG7 have larger total
payoffs than BG1). If we consider the CE, in G2 and G5 we introduce a decoy in such a way that
the target (B) is exactly in the middle: B = (A+C)/2. In G8, the target is not exactly in the middle.
Regarding the AE, the target is always as unequal as the decoy, but the size of the gains changes
(each player gains 10, 30 and 20 more in G3, G6 and G9, respectively, compared to the decoy).
Games 10-16: The second group consists of games where there is one unequal base contract
(the target) competing with a second more unequal but total-earnings maximizing base contract.
We include games that we already had in Experiment 1. These are games BG10, G11 and G12
where the less unequal contract is nearly equal. We also add new games (BG13, G14-G16) where
the more equal base contact is far from being “nearly equal”. In G14, we predict a CE, while in
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G15 and G16, an AE. In both G15 and G16, the decoy is constructed in such a way that it is at
least as unequal as the target. This is to discourage subjects from agreeing on the decoy. In G15
(G16), players make equal (unequal) gains from the unequal decoy by agreeing on the target. In
Experiment 1, we find a significant AE when the contracts are (40,120), (65,55), (55,45). However,
we cannot tell whether the AE occurs because the decoy is not equal or because the target offers
the same gains relative to the decoy (see footnote 25). The comparison between G15 and G16 will
shed light on this.
Games 17-20: In this group we consider games with an equal base contract which is the target
of a CE. In Experiment 1, the equal base contract offered 60 experimental points to each player. We
observed 90% agreements on that contract, leaving very little room for a CE to increase this pro-
portion. In Experiment 2, we lower the payoffs of this contract in order to potentially create more
“room” for a CE. First, we check whether we can replicate Experiment 1’s results by including two
games from the previous experiment. These correspond to BG17 and G18 in Experiment 2. We
then consider two additional games (BG19 and G20) where we lower the payoffs of the equal base
contract by 10 points.
Games 21-22: The last group of games are designed to study whether more extreme decoys are
less effective in inducing a CE. Recall that, by extremeness, we mean how unequal the decoy is.
More extreme decoys may be less effective in inducing a CE if players do not perceive them as
credible candidates to be agreed upon and just ignore them. The results of Experiment 1 do not
allow us to test for the extremeness of the decoy. In Experiment 1, we varied the extremeness of
the decoy only for the base game (40,120), (60,60) but we did not observe any CE at all in those
games. In Experiment 2, we test for the extremeness of the decoy in games with two unequal base
contracts. To economize on games, we construct the extreme decoys from existing base games. In
particular, we consider G21 (to be compared with BG1) and G22 (to be compared to BG10). Decoys
are more extreme in G21 and G22 than G2 and G11.
8 Findings from Experiment 2
The descriptive statistics for the 22 games are reported in Table 4.28 Figure 7 provides a visual
representation of how agreements (and disagreements) vary between each game and the corre-
sponding baseline game.
We first test whether there are CE and AE in all our games pooled together. The difference in
agreement on the target contract between each game and the corresponding base game is signif-
icantly greater than zero, both in games where we hypothesize a CE (one-tailed test, p = 0.004)
and games where we hypothesize an AE (one-tailed test, p < 0.001). This is in line with Find-
ing 1 of Experiment 1, suggesting that both CE and AE are statistically relevant. We also find
28As for Experiment 1, we pooled the data across player labels (Person 1 or 2). Due to a connectivity problem between
the server and the clients, we lost the data for a few bargaining interactions. Also, in half of the sessions, we dropped
the data from G5 and G6 because we realized the two base contracts were identical instead of being symmetrical. A
software fix resolved this problem for the remaining sessions.
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Game Obs. Contracts Disagree Agree Agree Agree Time toA B C on A on B on C agree (in sec.)
1 127 (40,60) (60,40) 8.66% 45.67% 45.67% 0% 73.07
2 128 (40,60) (60,40) (80,20) 7.03% 37.50% 53.91% 1.56% 69.84
3 127 (40,60) (60,40) (50,30) 4.72% 38.58% 51.98% 4.72% 75.54
4 128 (80,120) (120,80) 8.60% 45.70% 45.70% 0% 83.44
5 64 (80,120) (120,80) (160,40) 12.50% 29.69% 57.81% 0% 63.23
6 64 (80,120) (120,80) (90,50) 4.69% 43.75% 46.88% 4.68% 77.34
7 128 (50,150) (150,50) 13.28% 43.36% 43.36% 0% 82.35
8 127 (50,150) (150,50) (170,30) 18.11% 33.86% 45.67% 2.36% 82.40
9 127 (50,150) (150,50) (130,30) 9.45% 40.16% 48.82% 1.57% 83.05
10 127 (40,120) (65,55) 7.87% 20.47% 71.66% 0% 52.38
11 128 (40,120) (65,55) (120,40) 3.91% 9.38% 81.25% 5.46% 49.88
12 127 (40,120) (65,55) (55,45) 0.79% 9.45% 88.98% 0.78% 47.46
13 128 (60,140) (95,65) 3.90% 29.69% 66.41% 0% 62.24
14 128 (60,140) (95,65) (140,60) 6.25% 12.50% 71.88% 9.37% 56.54
15 128 (60,140) (95,65) (85,55) 3.90% 10.16% 85.94% 0% 54.04
16 128 (60,140) (95,65) (80,40) 3.90% 16.41% 78.91% 0.78% 49.41
17 128 (120,40) (60,60) 2.34% 9.38% 88.28% 0% 42.23
18 126 (120,40) (60,60) (40,120) 3.17% 3.17% 90.48% 3.18% 37.29
19 128 (120,40) (50,50) 4.69% 26.56% 68.75% 0% 45.08
20 128 (120,40) (50,50) (40,120) 4.69% 8.98% 77.34% 8.99% 48.14
21 128 (40,60) (60,40) (95,5) 6.25% 40.63% 51.56% 1.56% 71.90
22 128 (40,120) (65,55) (155,5) 5.47% 7.81% 86.72% 0% 46.85
Notes: For each game there are between 128 and 126 observations (number of pairs) except in Games 5 and 6 where we have only
64 observations (see footnote 28). Base games are shaded in grey. The contract labels A, B, and C were not used in the experiment.
Table 4: Aggregate bargaining outcomes (Experiment 2).
heterogeneity in these effects across games. Regarding the CE, we find that the target contract is
agreed on more frequently in G2 vs. BG1 (one-tailed test, p = 0.036), G5 vs. BG4 (one-tailed test,
p = 0.080),29 G11 vs. BG10 (one-tailed test, p = 0.012), G20 vs. BG19 (one-tailed test, p = 0.013),
G21 vs. BG1 (one-tailed test, p = 0.072), and G22 vs. BG10 (one-tailed test, p = 0.002). Regarding
the AE, we find that the target contract is agreed on more frequently in G9 vs. BG7 (one-tailed test,
p = 0.062), G12 vs. BG10 (one-tailed test, p < 0.001), G15 vs. BG13 (one-tailed test, p = 0.004),
and G16 vs. BG13 (one-tailed test, p = 0.009).
8.1 Games with an Equal Payoff Contract
In comparing G18 with BG17, we replicate what we found in Experiment 1: roughly 90% of the
bargaining pairs agree on the equal payoff contract, and there is no significant CE (one-tailed test,
p = 0.286). In BG19 and G20, we lower the payoffs of the equal contract by 10 points in order to
reduce its attractiveness and test whether a decoy would now make the target more agreed upon.
In BG19, subjects still agree mostly on the equal contract B, but significantly less often than in
BG17 (p = 0.001). This gives more “room” for the CE, and we now observe a significant increase
in the agreements on B when we compare G20 to BG19 (one-tailed test, p = 0.013).
Finding 8. In a game with an equal payoff but not total payoff maximizing contract, there is a significant
CE on that contract if total payoffs are low enough.
29The CE in G5 is visibly large but it is significant only at the 10% level. This is because we collected fewer observa-
tions in G5. See footnote 28.
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Note: the difference in the agreement rate on C between a game and its corresponding base game is
obtained by setting the agreement rate on C equal to zero in the base game.
Figure 7: Changes in agreements on A, B, C and disagreements for each game, compared to the
base game
This result confirms previous evidence from Galeotti et al. (2019) showing that a significant CE
exists in some (but not all) games with an equal but not total-earnings maximizing contract and
this depends on the attractiveness of the equal payoff contract.30 Finding 8 suggests that we
can expect the CE to be a quite generic phenomenon in unstructured bargaining with commonly
known money payoffs: it remains significant even when one of the contracts offers equal but
sufficiently low earnings.
8.2 Games with Two Symmetrically Unequal Payoff Contracts
If we consider jointly all games with two symmetrically unequal payoff base contracts (Games
1–9 and 21), we reject the null hypothesis that the average difference in agreement on the target
contract between each game and the base game is equal to zero (one-tailed tests, p = 0.035 for CE
and 0.017 for AE). This confirms that AE and CE are relevant in games with two symmetrically
unequal payoff contracts. If we look at the games separately, we replicate Finding 3 from Experi-
ment 1: subjects agree more on B in G2 than BG1 (one-tailed test, p = 0.036), while the AE (G3 vs.
30Games 17-20 are also analyzed in Galeotti et al. (2019). They find a lower frequency of agreements on the equal
contract in the base game, leaving more room for the CE to manifest itself. Similarly to our study, the CE effect is
statistically significant only when the equal contract offers sufficiently low total payoffs compared with the unequal
one (see footnote 39 in Galeotti et al. 2019).
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BG1) is not large enough to achieve statistical significance (one-tailed test, p = 0.121).31
If we increase the inequality in the payoffs of the two base contracts (BG4 and BG7), we still
find a significant CE in G5 (one-tailed test, p = 0.080)32 but not in G8 (one-tailed test, p = 0.274).33
A possible explanation is that the subjects whose preferred contract (B) is made a compromise by
the introduction of the decoy will bargain harder in favour of B, while some of those who are in
the weaker bargaining position (i.e. those who would get 50 from the compromise) are reluctant
to accept the highly unequal contract B – even if it is a compromise and not the most unequal
contract – and rather prefer to disagree. Note, however, that the decoy in G8 is not completely
without effect. It reduces agreements on A (one-tailed test, p = 0.029) and slightly increases
disagreement, though not significantly so (p = 0.188).
The inequality of the payoffs in the two base contracts does not appear to affect the AE. We
observe an increase in the agreements on contract B both in G6 and G9, but it is either not large
enough to achieve statistical significance (BG4 vs. G6, one-tailed test, p = 0.285) or it is only
weakly significant (BG7 vs. G9, one-tailed test, p = 0.062).
8.3 Games with Two Asymmetrically Unequal Payoff Contracts
Let us now consider games where there is one unequal base contract (the target) competing with a
second more unequal but total-earnings maximizing base contract (G10-G16 and G22). If we pool
together all games where we expect a CE, we find that the average difference in agreement on the
target contract between each game and the base game is positive and significant (one-tailed test,
p = 0.002). A similar result is obtained if we consider the games where we expect a AE (one-tailed
test, p < 0.001).
If we look at the games separately, we fully replicate previous results from Experiment 1. In
line with Finding 4, agreements on the nearly equal payoff contract in BG10 are significantly lower
than agreements on the equal payoff contract in BG17 (the agreement rate on B drops by almost
17% as in Experiment 1, p = 0.003). Also, the nearly equal payoffs contract (65,55) can be made
significantly more agreed on via a CE (G11 vs. BG10; one-tailed test, p = 0.012) or an AE (G12 vs.
BG10; one-tailed test, p < 0.001). This confirms Finding 5 from Experiment 1.
In the other games (BG13, G14-G16) the less unequal base contract is not anymore “nearly
equal”. In G14, we observe an increase in the frequency of agreements on contract B compared to
BG13 (in line with a CE), but the effect is not large enough to achieve statistical significance with
the sample size used (one-tailed test, p = 0.134). In both G15 and G16, we observe a significant
AE (one-tailed test, p = 0.004 and 0.009). Recall that we find in Experiment 1 a significant AE
when the decoy offers only nearly as opposed to exactly equal payoffs. However, we cannot tell
31If we pool the data of the two experiments together, the AE becomes (weakly) statistically significant (one-tailed
test, p = 0.051), suggesting that the AE is not totally absent but only less strong than the CE.
32See footnote 29.
33Conflict is harsher in games BG7-G9 than in games BG1-G3 and BG4-G6. This is captured by the larger rate of
disagreement and the fact that subjects took longer to agree in BG7-G9. On average, the disagreement rate is 13.61%
in BG7-G9 against 6.81% in BG1-G3 (p = 0.002) and 8.60% in BG4-G6 (p = 0.031). Agreement times are, on average,
higher in BG7-G9 than BG1-G3 (82.61 sec. vs. 72.83 sec., p = 0.006) and BG4-G6 (82.61 sec. vs. 77.01 sec., p = 0.109).
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whether this is because the decoy is not equal (and thus does not compete with the target in terms
of focality) or because the target offers the same gain relative to the decoy. In G16 of Experiment
2, the decoy offers more unequal gains relative to the target but, yet, we still find a significant AE.
Hence, we can conclude that, in games with two asymmetrically unequal payoff contracts, AEs
arise as long as the decoy is not equal and irrespectively of whether the target offers the same gain
relative to the decoy.
8.4 Games with Extreme Decoys
We finally consider whether more extreme decoys are less effective in inducing a CE. We test that
by comparing G21 and BG1, and G22 and BG10. If we pool the games together, we find that the
average difference in agreement on the target contract between each game and the base game is
positive and significant (one-tailed test, p = 0.003). If we look at each game separately, we find a
weakly significant CE in G21 (one-tailed test, p = 0.072) and a significant CE in G22 (one-tailed
test, p = 0.002). The increase in the frequency of agreements on the target is analogous if we
compare G21 to G2 (p = 0.714), and G22 to G11 (p = 0.159), suggesting that more extreme decoys
are as effective as more moderate decoys in inducing a CE.
8.5 Agreement Times
We can also, as for Experiment 1, consider the agreement times (cf Table 4). First of all, if we
focus on the games included in both experiments, subjects were faster in reaching an agreement
in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1 (on average, they were 14.02 sec. faster, p < 0.001).
The full list of games was not the same between the two experiments. Also, we conducted the
two experiments in different years with different students. All this may explain this discrepancy
in agreement times.
Despite this difference, most of the variation in agreement times across games observed in
Experiment 2 is consistent with what we found in Experiment 1 (see the online Appendix for
details). Also, if we pool the games together, we find that adding a decoy significantly reduces
the time taken to agree by, on average, 7.76% for compromise situations (p = 0.011) and 10.69%
for attraction situations (p = 0.023). This result holds even if we include bargaining pairs that
disagreed and set the agreement times for these pairs at 120 seconds. With the inclusion of the
disagreeing pairs, creating a compromise still reduces agreement times by 6.64% (p = 0.023), and
an attraction does so by 12.22% (p = 0.010). This confirms our results from Experiment 1 that
adding a decoy contract speeds up the process of reaching an agreement.
8.6 Econometric Analysis
In the online Appendix, we examine all our data at once from both experiments using regression
analysis to check the robustness of our results and test the simultaneous effects of the feasible
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agreements’ characteristics on the CE and AE. The analysis corroborates the main findings re-
ported in the paper. In particular, we confirm that CEs increase agreements on the target if none
of the base contracts offers equal payoffs, while they disappear if the non-targeted base contract
gives equal payoffs or if the target contract is the most unequal. Similar patterns are detected for
AEs. We also confirm that CE is less likely to manifest itself in highly conflictual games where the
base contracts are symmetric and highly unequal. If the target contract offers equal payoffs, it is
possible to observe a CE but only if the payoffs of the equal contract are low enough. If the pay-
offs are larger, the contract is almost universally chosen and there is not enough room for a CE to
manifest itself. Finally, more extreme decoys are equally effective in inducing CEs. Interestingly,
in all regressions reported in the online Appendix, AEs appear to be as relevant as CEs.
9 Discussion
In this section we discuss how changing some features of the design might impact the results.
First, the players’ monetary payoffs are commonly known. This may not be a good assumption
for many real bargaining settings. Each bargainer may know only his or her own payoffs from
agreeing on a contract, see for example Roth and Murnighan (1982). One conjecture is that such
private payoff information makes the AE and CE stronger since payoff focality, which is based
on commonly known money payoffs, is muted. On the other hand, this kind of private payoff
information also means that it is no longer from the outset common knowledge if a contract is a
compromise or dominates other contracts. Thus it is a priori unclear what the strength of the AE
and CE are in such a framework.
Second, we used an unstructured bargaining protocol, where players are free to make as many
offers and counteroffers as they like. This is a feature of many real-world bargaining situations
(for a recent review on unstructured bargaining experiments, see Karagözoğlu, 2019). In such an
environment players have ample opportunities to coordinate on an agreement. It seems relevant
to also study the AE and CE in an environment where the players need to coordinate quickly
(modeled, in an extreme way, as a one-shot game).
Finally, we assumed there was a small number of feasible contracts. A question for future
research is whether context effects of the type studied in this paper (bargainers choosing an inter-
mediate alternative, or an alternative that dominates others) exist in settings with a much larger
set of possible contracts.
10 Conclusion
The Attraction and Compromise Effects (AE and CE) are celebrated findings from individual deci-
sion making. This paper reports the findings from what we believe is the first study of the role the
AE and CE play in bargaining situations. In our bargaining environment, players negotiate over a
set of feasible contracts, where a contract specifies an amount of money to each player. We define
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the CE as a situation where making a contract a compromise makes it more likely to be agreed
on. The AE happens when a contract becomes more likely to be agreed on when it dominates
another contract. These effects should not be observed according to the axiom of independence of
irrelevant alternatives, or the Nash Bargaining Solution.
We systematically vary the money payoffs offered by the feasible contracts, and for each pay-
off condition we study the relevance of the AE and CE. Our experiments provide us with an
impression of and prediction for when we should expect these effects to significantly matter in
bargaining.
We observe that the CE is significant across a wide variety of payoff conditions, and varies
with these in a quite intuitive way. The CE ceases to be significant if it targets the more unequal
contract, if one of the contracts offers exactly equal and sufficiently high payoffs, or if the conflict
between contracts whose payoffs are diametrically opposed becomes very high. Taken as a whole,
the property of being a compromise per se is an important one in bargaining.
The AE is less robust than the CE. Like the CE, when there is no equal payoff contract, we
observe that the AE can make a contract more likely to be agreed on if this contract is the less
unequal contract. On the other hand, if the contracts are diametrically opposed (‘symmetrically
unequal’ around the 45 degree line), and hence equally payoff focal, then the AE is less effective in
increasing agreements on the target contract compared to the CE. These novel findings can serve
as a first guide to when we should expect the AE and CE to be present in bargaining situations.
We believe our findings are of significant practical interest for managers in a variety of situa-
tions. These include labor-management negotiations, wage negotiations, mergers & acquisitions
agreements, hiring decisions, business-to-business and intra-organizational negotiations, just to
mention a few. Our results suggest that managers and business executives should carefully con-
sider the set of available alternatives when they enter into negotiations with, for example, a labor
union, a business partner or the head of another department. They should keep in mind that
any seemingly irrelevant alternative that is brought to the table, intentionally or not, by any party
in the negotiation may not be as innocuous as it appears to be. It may in fact have a consider-
able effect on the bargaining outcome, especially when it makes one of the other alternatives a
compromise or a dominant alternative.
As a concrete example, consider hiring decisions. It is common to draw a shortlist and then
choose a candidate out of this reduced set, usually after all candidates are interviewed. The de-
cision of who gets an offer can be influenced by bargaining between (some of the) members of
the interview panel, or between the manager of a department and his or her own line manager.
Managers may wish to add a candidate that is dominated by their preferred candidate in order to
highlight the qualities of their preferred candidate, or add an “extreme” version of their preferred
candidate (one that may be unacceptable to the other members of the organization) in order to
make their own candidate appear a compromise. Our findings suggest that a decoy will be more
effective when it favors a candidate that has broad appeal (analogous to the least unequal con-
tract) rather than a candidate who polarizes opinion (analogous to the more unequal contract).
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The use of decoys may or may not be advantageous to the organization as a whole. A common
HR guideline for interview panels is to evaluate candidate responses/performance against the se-
lection criteria for the role, rather than compare the candidate to other candidates. This guideline
may be intended to mitigate context effects such as the ones studied in this paper.
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